Federal whistleblower protections
By: Richard Renner, Legal Director, National Whistleblower Center, 3238 P St., NW, Washington, DC 20007, (202) 342-1903, rr@whistleblowers.org, www.whistleblowers.org
A hyperlinked version of this article is at: http://www.taterenner.com/dol-intro.htm
I. Introduction |
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A. Goals for this lecture are for participants to be able to |
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II. Whistleblower protection, what is it? |
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B. The right to assist in enforcement actions without retaliation. |
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C. Why does government provide employee protections? |
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III. The sources of the law |
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D. The Acts |
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E. The regulations |
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F. Legislative History and purpose |
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G. Construction is patterned after the NLRA, and Civil Rights Act of 1964. |
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H. Remedial statutes are construed broadly to accomplish their purpose |
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IV. Protected activity |
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I. What can employees do to get under the umbrella of protection? |
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J. What can an employee do to leave the umbrella, and lose protection? |
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K. Complaints must have a nexus to the safety or environmental purpose of the statute. |
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V. Discrimination has many forms. |
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L. The definition of discriminatory acts under 29 C.F.R. Part 24 is broad. |
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M. Restraints on protected activities |
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VI. Procedures for complaints |
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N. Filing a complaint |
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O. Time limits for Environmental Whistleblowers: 30 days |
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P. Sarbanes-Oxley and AIR 21: 90 days |
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Q. Nuclear Whistleblowers and Surface Transportation: 180 days |
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R. Investigation, hearing, and appeals |
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S. Appeals from the ALJ RD&O |
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T. District Court civil actions (and jury trials) |
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U. Elements of the claim |
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V. Methods of proving retaliation |
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W. Remedies |
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X. Sarbanes-Oxley criminal retaliation |
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VII. Other sources of information | 19 |
No person shall fire, or in any other way discriminate against, or cause to be fired or discriminated against, any employee or any authorized representative of employees by reason of the fact that such employee or representative has filed, instituted, or caused to be filed or instituted any proceeding under this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any proceeding resulting from the administration or enforcement of the provisions of this chapter.
(1) No employer may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee (or any person acting pursuant to a request of the employee) has
(A) Commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding under this subchapter or a proceeding for the administration or enforcement of the drinking water regulations or underground injection control programs of a State,
(B) Testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or
(C) Assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner in any such proceeding or in any other action to carry out the purposes of this subchapter.
These "whistleblower" provisions are designed to protect employees from retaliation for protected activities such as complaining, testifying, or commencing proceedings against an employer for a violation of one of these federal statutes. Devereux v. Wyoming Association of Rural Water, 93-ERA-18 (Sec’y, October 1, 1993). A complainant can assert jurisdiction under all of these statues in the same proceeding, if the complainant has participated in activities in furtherance of the objectives of all the statues. See, Jenkins v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 92-CAA-6 (Sec’y, May 18, 1994); Minnard v. Nerco Delamar Co., Case No. 92-SWD-1, (Sec’y, Jan. 25, 1994). Respondent opposes federal jurisdiction, contending that the Marion project is, basically, a State of Ohio project; that the investigation was a State investigation, and that Paul Jayko was a State employee of a State agency involved in the project, before actual involvement of U.S. Government agencies. The employee protection provisions have been construed broadly to afford protection for participation in activities in furtherance of the statutory objectives. See, Devereux, supra, and Tyndall v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 93-CAA-6, 95-CAA-5 (ARB, June 14, 1998). For reasons more particularly set forth herein, I find Mr. Jayko had either begun proceedings, or was about to begin, proceedings under the provisions of all seven Acts and will proceed accordingly.
The purposes and employee protections of the seven environmental Acts are as follows:
The Clean Air Act ["CAA"] aims to "protect and enhance the quality of the nation’s air resources." 42 U.S.C. 7401(b). The Act states that "[n]o employer" may discriminate with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, of any employee who has "commenced caused to be commenced, or is about to commence a proceeding" under the Act, or testified, or is about to testify in any proceeding, or who has "assisted or participated or is about to participate in any manner in such a proceeding or in any other action in "carrying out the purposes of the act." 42 U.S.C. 7622(3).
The objective of the, Safe Drinking Water Act ["SDWA"], 42 U.S.C. 300j-9, a subdivision of the Public Health Service Act, ["PHSA"], is to promote safe drinking water. It also states that "[n]o employer" may discharge or otherwise discriminate against employees who have engaged in any of the same actions as those forth in the CAA, or have assisted in a "proceeding to carry out the purposes of this subchapter."
The primary purpose of the The Toxic Substances Control Act [ "TSCA"], 15 U.S.C. 2622, is to "assure that chemical substances and mixtures do not present unreasonable risks of injury to health or the environment." It also states that "[n]o employer" may discriminate against a person because that person has taken any of the same actions as those listed in the CAA, to carry out the purposes of the TSCA, except that there is no specific reference to "a proceeding for the administration" of the Act. 15 U.S.C. 2601(b)(3). Subsection 2602(2)(B)(iv) exempts "special source material," "special nuclear material" and "byproduct material" as defined by the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2014) from the ambit of the statute.
The purpose of the Solid Waste Disposal Act ["SWDA"], 42 U.S.C. 6971, is to "assure that hazardous waste management practices are conducted in a manner that protects human health and the environment [and to] minimize the generation of hazardous waste." 42 U.S.C. 6902(a). The Act prohibits any "person" from firing or otherwise discriminating against any employee who has "filed, instituted or caused to be filed or instituted any proceeding," under the Act, or testified, or is about to testify in any proceeding in any proceeding resulting from the administration of the act." 42 U.S.C. 6971(a).
The objective of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ["CERCLA"], 42 U.S.C. 9601, et seq. is to prevent the release of hazardous substances into the air or water. Similar to the SWDA, it prohibits any "person" from firing or otherwise discriminating against any employee who has provided information to a State or Federal Government, filed instituted or caused to be filed or instituted any proceeding under the Act, or has testified in "any proceeding resulting from the administration or enforcement" of the act. 42 U.S.C. 9610(a).
The The Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act ["WPCA"]commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act ["CWA"], 33 U.S.C. 1251, is designed to "restore and maintain chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters." The Act also prohibits any "person" from firing or otherwise discriminating against any employee that has filed, instituted, or caused to file or institute , or has either testified or is about to testify concerning proceedings under the Act. 33 U.S.C. 1367.
The Energy Reorganization Act ["ERA"], 42 U.S.C. Section 5851, addresses "whistleblower" protection against harassment and retaliation by an "employer" for employees involved in the nuclear industry, who, inaddition to the other protections set forth in the six other Acts: (1) notify their employer of an alleged violation, (2) oppose a practice that would be a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or (3) testify before Congress or any Federal or State agency regarding a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Similar to the wording of the CAA, SDWA and the TSCA, it states that "[n]o employer" may discharge or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because the employee engaged in the above activities, or has assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner in such proceedings as those listed, "or in any other action to carry out the purposes of this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954." The other three Acts state that, "[n]o person" may engage in such discriminatory conduct against an employee for protected conduct.
The ERA differs from the other six Acts in that, once the complainant establishes a prima facie case, the employer must establish by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same unfavorable action, i.e. taken its unfavorable action for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason, as it would have taken, in the absence of the employee’s protected activity, rather than merely "articulating" or stating the legitimate business reasons for the action, as is the case with the other six Acts. Another difference is that the employer may be directed to "abate" certain effects of the employer’s unfavorable personnel action (which means that the discriminatee may be ordered reinstated with back pay) except compensatory damages, pending court review of the final decision of the Secretary of Labor.
the best source of information about what a company is actually doing or not doing is often its own employees, and this amendment would ensure that an employee could provide such information without losing his job or otherwise suffering economically from retribution from the polluter.
If employees are coerced and intimidated into remaining silent when they should speak out, the result can be catastrophic. Recent events here and around the world underscore the realization that such complicated and dangerous technology can never be safe without constant human vigilance. The employee protection provision involved in this case thus serves the dual function of protecting both employees and the public from dangerous radioactive substances.
This statutory provision prohibits any company with a class of securities registered under §12 of the Security Exchange Act of 1934, or required to file reports under §15(d) of the same Act, or any officer, employee, or agent of such company, from discharging, harassing, or in any other manner discriminating against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because the employee provided to the employer or Federal Government information relating to alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§1341, (mail fraud), 1343 (wire fraud), 1344 (bank fraud) and 1348 (securities fraud), any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission ["SEC"], or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.
After corporate scandals shook investor confidence in 2001-2002, Congress reacted at lightning speed, passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The law seemed correct for its time, passing in the Senate with no negative votes and overwhelmingly in the House. That combination of speed and apparently universal support may conceal fundamental compliance problems for employers and mask enforcement problems for regulators while it offers up a new bonanza of profitable litigation for lawyers in the plaintiffs' bar and their clients.
. . . from the legislative history and the court and agency precedents . . . it is clear that Congress intended the 'whistleblower' statutes to be broadly interpreted to achieve the legislative purpose of encouraging employees to report hazards to the public and protect the environment by offering them protection in their employment.
Faulkner v. Olin Corp., 85-SWD-3, R. D&O of ALJ, pp. 5-6 (August 16, 1985), adopted by the SOL (November 18, 1985).
(1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders, when the information or assistance is provided to or the investigation is conducted by
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct); or
(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in a proceeding filed or about to be filed (with any knowledge of the employer) relating to an alleged violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.
No particular form of complaint is required, except that a complaint must be in writing and should include a full statement of the acts and omissions, with pertinent dates, which are believed to constitute the violation.
Occupational Safety & Health Administration
200 Constitution Ave NW, Rm N3647
Washington, DC 20210
Compliance Programs Fax: 202-693-1659
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit utilizes a five part test that focuses on lack of actual or constructive knowledge of the filing requirements, diligence, prejudice to the opposing party, and reasonableness of the ignorance of the law; although, ignorance of the law alone is not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. Andrew v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1988). The Secretary has indicated that the Andrew analysis should be applied in cases arising in the Sixth Circuit. Rainey v. Wayne State University, 89-ERA-8 (Sec'y May 9, 1991). In cases outside the Sixth Circuit, the Secretary has applied the framework in used by U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. See Doyle v. Alabama Power Co., 87-ERA-43 (Sec'y Sept. 29, 1989) [citing School District of the City of Allentown, 657 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1981)] , aff'd sub. nom. Doyle v. Secretary of Labor, No. 89-7863 (11th Cir. 1989).
Chief Administrative Law Judge
U.S. Department of Labor
Suite 400 North
800 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001-8002
(202) 693-7300
(202) 693-7365 (FAX)
See e.g., Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Systems, Inc., 735 F.2d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 1984); DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281, 286 (6th Cir. 1983) (NRC proceedings under the ERA or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954)
In environmental whistleblower cases, the complainant has an initial burden of proof to make a prima facie case by showing (1) the complainant engaged in a protected activity; (2) the complainant was subjected to adverse action; and, (3) the evidence is sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that the protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action. Zinn v. University of Missouri, 93-ERA-34 and 36 (Sec'y Jan. 18, 1996), and Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. Department of Labor, 992 F.2d 474 (3rd Cir. 1993).
Essentially, the Secretary has broadly defined a protected activity as a report of an act which the complainant reasonably believes is a violation of the environmental acts. While it doesn't matter whether the allegation is ultimately substantiated, the complaint must be "grounded in conditions constituting reasonably perceived violations of the environmental acts." Minard v. Nerco Delamar Co., 92-SWD-1 (Sec'y Jan. 25, 1995), slip op. at 8. In other words, the standard involves an objective assessment. The subjective belief of the complaint is not sufficient. Kesterson v. Y-12 Nuclear Weapons Plant, 95-CAA-12 (ARB Apr. 8, 1997). In the Minard case, the Secretary indicated the complainant must have reasonable belief that the substance is hazardous and regulated under an environmental law. Consequently, the complainant's concern must at least "touch on" the environment. Nathaniel v Westinghouse Hanford Co., 91- SWD-2 (Sec'y Feb. 1, 1995), slip op. at 8-9; and, Dodd v. Polysar Latex, 88-SWD-4 (Sec'y Sept. 22, 1994).
To prevail on the third element of the prima facie case, a complainant only needs to establish a reasonable inference that his or her protected activity lead to, or caused, the respondent's adverse action. This burden to show an inference of unlawful discrimination is not onerous. McMahan v. California Water Quality Control Board, San Diego Region, 90-WPC-1 (Sec'y Jul. 16, 1993). At this point of the process, the complainant need only present evidence sufficient to prevail until contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Jackson v. The Comfort Inn, Downtown, 93-CAA-7 (Sec'y Mar. 16, 1995), citing Carroll v. Bechtel Power Corp., 91-ERA-46 (Sec'y Feb. 15, 1995), slip op. at 11.
Resort to a pretextual explanation is, like flight from a scene of the crime, evidence of consciousness of guilt, which is, of course, evidence of illegal conduct.
Sheridan v. DuPont, 100 F.3d 1061, 1069 (3d Cir. 1996), quoting Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 57 F.3d 193, 200 (2d Cir. 1995). A plaintiff can show pretext by revealing "'such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.'" Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 1092, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997)); see also Miller v. Eby Realty Group LLC, 396 F.3d 1105, 1110-11 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining that "[p]retext exists when an employer does not honestly represent its reasons"); Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280-81 (3d Cir. 2000) (evidence of pretext may satisfy causation prong).
If the Secretary concludes that the party charged has violated the law, the final order shall order the party charged to take appropriate affirmative action to abate the violation, including reinstatement of the complainant to that person's former position or substantially equivalent position . . .
29 C.F.R. § 24.6(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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